

Online Appendix for “Voting for Trade Protectionist Parties: Evidence from Nine Waves of the European Social Survey”

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Data Description

Table A.1. Operationalization and descriptive statistics of variables

Variables	Wording / Coding	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Protectionist vote	Dichotomous variable capturing the respondent’s vote for a protectionist party in the last national elections (based on Rueda and Stegmueller 2019)	.270	.444	0	1
Educational attainment:					
Less than lower	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is less than lower secondary and 0 otherwise.	.084	.278	0	1
Lower secondary	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is lower secondary and 0 otherwise.	.142	.349	0	1
Upper secondary	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is upper secondary and 0 otherwise.	.189	.391	0	1
Advanced vocational	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent’s highest level of education is advanced vocational and 0 otherwise.	.199	.399	0	1
Tertiary education	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent’s highest level of	.131	.338	0	1

	education is tertiary education and 0 otherwise.					
Unemployed	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is currently unemployed and 0 otherwise.	.042	.201	0	1	
Union membership	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent is or was a member of a labor union or a similar organization and 0 otherwise.	.500	.500	0	1	
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Individual controls						
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Female	Dichotomous variable measuring the gender of the respondent in two categories (0 = male, 1 = female).	.528	.499	0	1	
Age_r	Continuous variable that captures age of respondents, rescaled following Gelman (2008).	-.000	.410	-1.1	1.50	
Domicile_r	Categorical variable that captures respondents' description of their domicile ranging from 1 = farm or home in countryside to 5 = big city (rescaled following Gelman 2008).	-.000	.499	-.85	.77	
Native	Dichotomous variable that takes value 1 if the respondent was born in the country where the survey is taken and 0 otherwise.	.940	.237	0	1	
Left-Right ideology_r	Continuous variable that indicates respondents' self-placement on the left-right scale from 0 to 10 (rescaled following Gelman 2008).	-.001	.500	-1.1	1.02	
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Contextual factors						
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Compensation potential_r	Percent of total social protection expenditure over GDP (rescaled following Gelman 2008).	-1.7e-09	.5	-1.0	1.12	
GDP per capita_r	Gross Domestic Product per capita valued at constant euros adjusted at ppp (rescaled following Gelman 2008).	-2.8e-10	.5	-1.2	2.39	
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Unemployment rate_r	Percent of unemployed over labor force (rescaled following Gelman 2008).	-2.0e-09	.5	-.76	1.38	
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Immigration ratio_r Percent of foreign born over total population (rescaled following Gelman 2008). 5.15e-10 .5 -.81 1.72

Robustness Checks

Table A.2. The determinants of vote for protectionist parties: Wave fixed effects

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Unemployed	0.0436*** (0.00927)	0.0343*** (0.00819)	0.0375*** (0.00889)	0.0361*** (0.00903)
Upper secondary education	-0.0126* (0.00669)	-0.0135** (0.00668)	-0.0121 (0.00745)	-0.0209** (0.00840)
Advanced vocational education	-0.0243** (0.00940)	-0.0234** (0.00921)	-0.0261*** (0.00995)	-0.0321*** (0.0105)
Tertiary education	-0.0451*** (0.0107)	-0.0447*** (0.0107)	-0.0399*** (0.0105)	-0.0460*** (0.0114)
Union membership	0.0146** (0.00599)	0.0123** (0.00583)	0.0279*** (0.00639)	0.0210*** (0.00664)
Social protection (rescaled)		0.0867 (0.156)	0.185 (0.172)	0.174 (0.158)
GDP per capita (rescaled)		0.0971 (0.231)	0.263 (0.234)	0.255 (0.243)
Unemployment rate (rescaled)		0.178 (0.138)	0.0119 (0.124)	-0.0332 (0.126)
Immigration ratio (rescaled)		0.336* (0.184)	0.00223 (0.221)	0.0901 (0.234)
Unemployed*Social protection (rescaled)		-0.0149 (0.0202)	-0.00642 (0.0205)	-0.0227 (0.0215)
Age (rescaled)	-0.00158 (0.00782)	9.22e-05 (0.00783)	-0.00290 (0.00823)	-0.00500 (0.00771)
Female	-0.00346 (0.00349)	-0.00268 (0.00352)	-0.00407 (0.00361)	-0.00459 (0.00364)
Habitat size (rescaled)	-0.00490 (0.00628)	-0.00463 (0.00626)	-0.00109 (0.00657)	0.000477 (0.00761)
Native	-0.0167** (0.00827)	-0.0145* (0.00829)	-0.0297*** (0.0103)	-0.0353*** (0.0103)
Left-right ideology (rescaled)	-0.0997*** (0.0260)	-0.110*** (0.0258)	-0.151*** (0.0244)	-0.133*** (0.0283)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Wave fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.391*** (0.0678)	0.166 (0.125)	0.234 (0.147)	0.241 (0.154)

Observations	145,342	143,195	143,195	143,195
R ²	0.115	0.133	0.134	0.096

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-wave level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 indicates that a party is more protectionist than the median degree of protectionism across parties competing in a given election after excluding parties with less than 5 percent of the vote. The dependent variable in Model 3 instead takes as a cutoff point the arithmetic mean of protectionism of parties in the country that received at least 5 percent of the vote in the latest national election. Finally, the dependent variable in Model 4 classifies parties as protectionist if their protectionism score falls above the weighted mean of the scores of all parties in the election covered in the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset with weights given by vote shares.

Table A.3. The determinants of vote for protectionist parties: Logit models

VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Unemployed	1.201*** (0.0528)	1.180*** (0.0521)	1.179*** (0.0447)	1.173*** (0.0481)
Upper secondary education	0.917* (0.0426)	0.915* (0.0437)	0.934 (0.0415)	0.907** (0.0416)
Advanced vocational education	0.872** (0.0567)	0.871** (0.0578)	0.895* (0.0515)	0.885** (0.0494)
Tertiary education	0.763*** (0.0567)	0.759*** (0.0574)	0.817*** (0.0513)	0.799*** (0.0510)
Union membership	1.086** (0.0427)	1.087** (0.0420)	1.151*** (0.0401)	1.108*** (0.0387)
Social protection (rescaled)		0.836 (1.540)	1.544 (2.072)	1.101 (1.319)
GDP per capita (rescaled)		0.455 (1.239)	0.530 (0.997)	0.402 (0.697)
Unemployment rate (rescaled)		5.047** (4.006)	1.400 (1.250)	1.038 (0.894)
Immigration ratio (rescaled)		3.868 (7.222)	0.190 (0.307)	0.637 (0.882)
Unemployed*Social protection (rescaled)		0.890 (0.125)	0.951 (0.0849)	0.913 (0.0938)
Age (rescaled)	0.995 (0.0530)	0.995 (0.0537)	0.979 (0.0438)	0.978 (0.0401)
Female	0.982 (0.0239)	0.984 (0.0248)	0.974 (0.0218)	0.978 (0.0204)
Habitat size (rescaled)	0.975 (0.0426)	0.972 (0.0436)	0.986 (0.0376)	0.999 (0.0427)
Native	0.892** (0.0503)	0.900* (0.0520)	0.861** (0.0524)	0.853*** (0.0505)
Left-right ideology (rescaled)	0.570*** (0.112)	0.533*** (0.106)	0.476*** (0.0743)	0.536*** (0.0960)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Constant	1.469 (0.709)	0.821 (1.010)	0.186 (0.264)	0.171 (0.200)
Observations	143,172	140,537	141,565	141,565
Pseudo-R ²	0.1447	0.1542	0.1255	0.0997

Note: These are odds ratios from logistic regressions; Robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 indicates that a party is more protectionist than the median degree of protectionism across parties competing in a given election after excluding parties with less than 5 percent of the vote. The dependent variable in Model 3 instead takes as a cutoff point the arithmetic mean of protectionism of parties in the country that received at least 5 percent of the vote in the latest national election. Finally, the dependent variable in Model 4 classifies parties as protectionist if their protectionism score falls above the weighted mean of the scores of all parties in the election covered in the Comparative Manifesto Project with weights given by vote shares.

Table A.4. The determinants of vote for protectionist parties: West vs. East

VARIABLES	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	West	East	West	East	West	East	West	East
Unemployed	0.04*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.05*** (0.01)	-0.01 (0.02)
Upper secondary education	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)
Advanced vocational education	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)
Tertiary education	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.04* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.04** (0.02)	-0.05** (0.02)
Union membership	0.02*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.02*** (0.01)	0.02** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Social protection (rescaled)			-0.43 (0.33)	1.03*** (0.30)	0.03 (0.44)	-0.98** (0.41)	0.17 (0.49)	-0.78** (0.37)
GDP per capita (rescaled)			-0.87** (0.42)	2.08*** (0.57)	-0.24 (0.57)	-0.05 (0.62)	-0.36 (0.59)	0.21 (0.72)
Unemployment rate (rescaled)			0.39** (0.18)	-0.63 (0.55)	0.05 (0.34)	1.68** (0.73)	-0.20 (0.36)	0.62 (0.71)
Immigration ratio (rescaled)			0.58** (0.28)	0.74 (0.47)	0.74 (0.50)	-1.32** (0.55)	0.79 (0.50)	-0.97* (0.49)
Unemployed*Social protection			-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.04)	-0.03 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.05)
Age (rescaled)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)
Female	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.01)
Habitat size (rescaled)	0.00	-0.02**	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01

	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Native	-0.03**	0.01	-0.03**	0.02	-0.03**	-0.03	-0.03**	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Left-right ideology (rescaled)	-0.11**	-0.09*	-0.11**	-0.11**	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.12**	-0.14***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	0.43***	0.13	0.58***	2.75***	0.10	-0.67	-0.04	0.10
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.19)	(0.63)	(0.32)	(0.84)	(0.34)	(0.84)
Observations	96,668	48,674	96,668	46,527	96,668	46,527	96,668	46,527
R ²	0.17	0.24	0.18	0.28	0.18	0.31	0.15	0.24

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 indicates that a party is more protectionist than the median degree of protectionism across parties competing in a given election after excluding parties with less than 5 percent of the vote. The dependent variable in Model 3 instead takes as a cutoff point the arithmetic mean of protectionism of parties in the country that received at least 5 percent of the vote in the latest national election. Finally, the dependent variable in Model 4 classifies parties as protectionist if their protectionism score falls above the weighted mean of the scores of all parties in the election covered in the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset with weights given by vote shares. West European countries are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden, whereas East European countries are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia.

Table A.5. The determinants of vote for protectionist parties: Left-wing vs. Right-wing Parties

VARIABLES	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
Unemployed	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Upper secondary education	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Advanced vocational education	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Tertiary education	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.03*	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Union membership	0.03***	-0.00	0.03***	-0.00	0.04***	0.01*	0.03***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Social protection (rescaled)			-0.14	-0.14	-0.18	-0.10	-0.25	-0.30
			(0.58)	(0.30)	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.44)
GDP per capita (rescaled)			-0.03	-0.39	-0.34	-0.24	-1.17	-0.31
			(0.96)	(0.46)	(0.97)	(0.60)	(0.89)	(0.60)

Unemployment rate (rescaled)			0.19	0.42*	-0.17	0.27	-0.38	0.38
			(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.28)
Immigration ratio (rescaled)			0.43	-0.00	0.10	-0.84**	0.18	-0.51
			(0.47)	(0.35)	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.48)	(0.39)
Unemployed*Social protection			-0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age (rescaled)	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Habitat size (rescaled)	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Native	-0.02**	0.01	-0.02**	0.01	-0.03***	-0.02	-0.03***	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Left-right ideology (rescaled)	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.03	-0.10***	-0.05*	-0.10***	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Country fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-0.04	0.38*	-0.09	0.42*	-0.20	0.15	-0.05	0.26
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.36)
Observations	47,767	76,783	47,085	76,104	47,085	76,104	47,085	76,104
R ²	0.49	0.25	0.49	0.26	0.44	0.27	0.47	0.25

Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the country-year level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. The dependent variable in Models 1 and 2 indicates that a party is more protectionist than the median degree of protectionism across parties competing in a given election after excluding parties with less than 5 percent of the vote. The dependent variable in Model 3 instead takes as a cutoff point the arithmetic mean of protectionism of parties in the country that received at least 5 percent of the vote in the latest national election. Finally, the dependent variable in Model 4 classifies parties as protectionist if their protectionism score falls above the weighted mean of the scores of all parties in the election covered in the Comparative Manifesto Project dataset with weights given by vote shares. Left-wing parties are the ones belonging to the radical left or the social democratic families, whereas right-wing parties are the ones belonging to the radical right, conservative, Christian democratic and liberal families.